

PTB-Workshop on  
“Protection of Measurement Data in Legal Metrology and Related Challenges”,  
30.11.-01.12.2011, PTB Berlin


# Protection of Taximeter Data by Secure Elements

Jörg Wolff  
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)  
[joerg.wolff@ptb.de](mailto:joerg.wolff@ptb.de)


# Outline

- Motivation
- How to Protect Taximeter Data?
- INSIKA Solution
- Why Secure Elements?
- Outlook


# Motivation: Protection of Taximeter Data



- different approaches in Greece, Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic,... (fiscal memories, fiscal taximeter, OTP, GPS,...)
- taximeter: type approval required, 2004/22/EC “Measurement Instruments Directive” (MID)
- → protection of taximeter data without touching the MID type approval




2004/22/EC “MID”




# Protection of Taximeter Data in Germany

- letter of the German Ministry of Finance (BMF) from Nov. 2010
- taxi companies should provide data of every trip and shift in electronic format
- Hamburg and Berlin support pilot tests, Hamburg supports equipment for every cab
- collaboration with Tesymex UG and HALE GmbH
- increasing interest of taxi companies



BMF letter from Nov. 2010


# Taximeter Environment



## Regulations touching Taximeters:


- \* MID 2004/22/EC incl. Annex MI-007 for Taximeter
- WELMEC
- OIML R 21 (2007) Taximeters
- CENELEC EN 50148
- CAN CiA 447-3
- national regulations (Germany: EO 18-2, PTB-A 18.21, Eichgesetz, PBefG, BOKraft, ...)

# System Concept I: Plain/Insecure Wireless Link



- no protection from alterations
- no assignment to origin

# Taximeter Stakeholders



- taximeter data = turnover data:  
cost of tampering  $\ll$  revenue from tampering
- taxi drivers, taxi companies and allied under general suspicion

# Taximeter Data, as defined in MID, Annex MI-007

4. A taximeter shall be able to supply the following data through an **appropriate secured interface(s)**:

- **operation position**: "For Hire", "Hired" or "Stopped";
- **totaliser data** according to paragraph 15.1;
- **general information**: (...)
- **fare information for a trip**:  
total charged, fare, calculation of the fare, supplement charge, date, start time, finish time, distance travelled;
- **tariff(s) information**: parameters of tariff(s).

of the European Union

L 135/69

NEX MI-007

TAXIMETERS

requirements of this Annex and the conformity assessment

) to make a measuring instrument.

the basis of a signal delivered by the distance signal generator, paid for a trip on the basis of the calculated distance and/or the

fixed initial hire fee and/or the length and/or the duration of the for extra services.

by a distance tariff value.

tariff)

below the cross over speed and application of the distance tariff

(tariff)

time tariff and distance tariff over the whole trip

different parts of its functioning. The operating positions are

calculation is disabled

calculation takes place on the basis of a possible initial charge and a the trip

for the trip is indicated and at least the fare calculation based

distance and to measure the duration of a trip.

display the fare, incrementing in steps equal to the resolution "Hired". The taximeter shall also be designed to display the in "Stopped".

calculation modes S and D. It shall be possible to choose between

ing data through an appropriate secured interface(s):

opped:

totaliser data according to paragraph 15.1;

— general information: constant of the distance signal generator, date of securing, taxi identifier, real time,

fare, calculation of the fare, supplement charge, date, start time,

→ no demand on interface or data format

(<sup>4</sup>) The distance signal generator is outside the scope of this Directive




# Security Properties for Taximeter Data

- **Integrity**  
protection from modifications
- **Authenticity** **primary**  
prove of origin
- **Non-Repudiation**  
protected assets cannot be repudiated
- **Confidentiality** **secondary**  
protection from eavesdropping

→ cryptographic technology can assure all security properties

(other security properties: availability, etc.)

# Asymmetric Cryptography: Digital Signatures



Algorithm Examples:


- RSA Signatures
- Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)

A calculates hash value of data and signs using the private key (PrivKey<sub>A</sub>)

B calculates hash value of data and can verify the signature by the use of A's public key (PubKey<sub>A</sub>)


[x] Integrity  
 [x] Authenticity  
 [c] Non-Repudiation  
 [ ] Confidentiality

# INSIKA Solution: End-to-End Security



# INSIKA Solution

- **INSIKA**  
integrated security solution for cash registers & measuring instruments
- **Intention**  
sign data of cash registers and taximeters by secure elements
- **Demands**  
error-free operation, trust of the users in the solution, long term protection (up to 10 years)
- **Kerckhoffs's principle**  
security of a crypto-system depends on secrecy of keys only, not on secrecy of the algorithm
- **Environment**  
developed for environments where  
cost of tampering  $\ll$  revenue from tampering



INSIKA Smart Card

# INSIKA Profile for Taximeters

- profiles for cash registers and taximeters
- digital signatures (ECDSA) & sequence numbers
- special smart card software-package
- smart cards personalised to VAT-ID of taxi company
- certificates and smart cards issued by a trust centre (PKI)
- other secure elements feasible



INSIKA Smart Card

# Secure Elements


- hardware based security
- secure environment: ability to protect data (e.g. private key) on a high level
- costs for readout of protected data (e.g. one particular private key) >> revenue from readout
- resistance against many side channel attacks (SPA, DPA, Timing,..)
- available as certificated hard- & software (up to CC EAL 4..5+..)
- most secure elements are smart card based components



Images: Oberthur Technologies, Giesecke & Devrient, Infineon

# Applications of Smart Cards

- Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM), [SIMalliance members shipped 3.9 billion SIM cards in 2010]
- payment cards: EMVCo (American Express, JCB, MasterCard and Visa) [1.4 billion cards used worldwide, except USA]
- new German identity card
- passports (MRTD - machine readable travel documents),
- new German health card
- signature cards



new German identity card




new German health card



electronic passport

Images: Giesecke & Devrient, Gematik, Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany


# INSIKA Solution: Open Interfaces



open interfaces, based on standards, independent from manufacturers, freely available (<http://insika.de/>)



# Open Interfaces: INSIKA Signature Interface



- ISO/IEC 7816 1-4 standard for smart cards
- defines physical layer up to application layer
- TIM interface adds 4 commands on application level
- master-slave, “T=1” protocol



# Open Interfaces: RESTful INSIKA Interface


- open interface - allows change of data center
- REST = Representational State Transfer
- simple webservice
- HTTP/HTTPS protocol and clearly defined methods, URIs and status codes
- transfer of XML messages in body:



```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<insika xmlns="http://insika.de/msg">
  <transactionEncoded>
    <itemListEncoded profile="taxi">SAEAsgIBDL0EIBEQBr4CFBE=
    </itemListEncoded>
    <transactionRequest>zQQgERAGzgIUE8YFNDAwMDHHFO/o11PEPln1HT
    6ucNs2z1rch0niyAID0uIL2AIBDNobHNSCBwA=</transactionRequest>
    <transactionResponse>xA9JT1NJS0FfVEVTVF9QVELFAQjLAQGeMF9EuXi
    SieiyGr44FMEzW7q7X2Cf78CD64x6Ovcoa6evwWFC5hSqmLKebj95d8+28g==
    </transactionResponse>
  </transactionEncoded>
</insika>
```

# Open Interfaces: XML Export Interface


- XML export contains signed taximeter data: smart card certificate, trips, shifts
- can be verified by INSIKA Verification Module (IVM) or any other tool



```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?><insika
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns="http://insika.de/export"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://insika.de/export
insikaB64.xsd"><timParams><timVersion>T.1.1.0</timVersion>
<tpId>INSIKA_TEST_PTB</tpId><tpIdNo>8</tpIdNo><certificate>MIIB46ADAgECAgMLOywwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYQxGZG5pc2N
oZSBCdW5kZkZlbnN0YWx0MSwKQYDVQQLDCJEUyYXRlbnR1bmlrYX
Rpb24gdW5kZkZlbnN0ZW10MRgwFgYDVQDDA9QVEIcGQ0EgMiAzM
DMwXzEwHhcNMTEwMDEwMTM0MTM0MTM0MTM0MTM0MTM0MTM0MTM0
CQYDVQGEwJERTEMMAoGAlUECgwDUFRCMRowGAYDVQQDDBFJTlNJS0F
fVEVTVF9QVEI0ODJBMGBByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEBAzIABM6Yr
qSno6j8tQGpc8JhZcORu3zQDixjwK77yIMyTYJb2iw1M9RCRbbeW2VF
MLxNaOBnDCBmTCBhgYDVR0fBH8wFTB7oHmgd4ZGbgRhcDovL2xkYXAu
aW5zaWthLmRlL0JM4OS9bjJlJTlNJS0EtdQlJMLCBvPUNSTCBEaXN0cm
lIdXRpb24sIGRjPUI0OU0lLQYYtaHR0cDovL2xkYXAuaW5zaWthLmRlL2
NybGRvd25sb2Fkcy9JTlNJS0EuY3JSM4GA1UdDwEBAQEAWIAgA==</
certificate></timParams><reportEncoded><itemListEncode
d
profile="taxi">oAExoQU0MDAwMaUCSQymAkhEpwENqAIVDKkDA1YM
rQQgEQkprgISUw==</itemListEncoded><reportRequest>zQQgER
AGzgIUE9QUimm3DieANEbn9tqpb/lc+VilrHw=</reportRequest><
reportResponse>wAEDxA9JTlNJS0FfVEVTVF9QVELFAQjMAQLSAQHT
AQHiC9gCAQzZAZqzbAgcAnjCa9icVrnHulwqNetsc+AJjWJh/cYELvUf
PruBfRy0VfyF2lRlNGGeGznHD+TF+dnw=</reportResponse></rep
ortEncoded><transactionEncoded><itemListEncoded
profile="taxi">sAEAsgIBDL0EIBEQBr4CFBE=</itemListEncode
d><transactionRequest>zQQgERAGzgIUE8YFNDAwMDHhFO/o11PEP
lnlHT6ucNs2zlrch0niyAID0uIL2AIBDNoBHNsCBwA=</transactio
nRequest><transactionResponse>xA9JTlNJS0FfVEVTVF9QVELFA
QjLAQGeMF9EuXiSIEiyGr44FMEzW7q7X2Cf78CD64x60Vcoa6evwWFC
5hSqmLKeBj95d8+28g==</transactionResponse>w=</itemListE
ncoded><reportRequest>zQQgEREhzgIUINQU7r2QLRq10wGVPnr3y
TAYQOhNdQ8=</reportRequest><reportResponse>wAEDxA9JTlN
JS0FfVEVTVF9QVELFAQjMASnSAQHTASTiDdgEARZ0DNkBDNsCBwCeMDB
3BvzmFXjwEcCpDmV6o3dn5BrIUVCN+zemd0lTaYyaFU2a7loni5L1Ad
1j0VbpSg==</reportResponse></reportEncoded></insika>
```




# Outlook



# Outlook

potential technical influences:

- upcoming: ETSI standard for embedded SIM (eUICC)
- other wireless technologies (LTE, taxi radio,..)
- other protocols (FTP, MQTT, IPv6,.. )
- other secure elements:  
( eUICC/UICC with integrated application,.. )
- usage of time stamp services
- new developments in M2M market



Images: Oberthur Technologies



Thank You!

The work of the INSIKA Project has been funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology under the grant MNPQ 11/07.

For further information please contact [insika@ptb.de](mailto:insika@ptb.de) or visit: <http://www.insika.de/>

Gefördert durch:



Bundesministerium  
für Wirtschaft  
und Technologie

aufgrund eines Beschlusses  
des Deutschen Bundestages